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TheExchange System and the
Growth of the Economy
Sourcesof economic growth include changes in both the amounts and pro-
ductivity of the factors of production. The possible effects of the exchange sys-
tem on the rate of growth will be discussed here in those terms.
It may be safely assumed that the effect of the exchange system on the
size of the labor force is negligible: it is unlikely that this system could have
any considerable impact—at least in the circumstances of Israel—on either
the rate of natural increase of population, the amount of immigration (or
emigration), or the rate of participation in the labor force. The present dis-
cussion will, therefore, be confined to the possible effects of the system on
capital formation. The two sources of capital accumulation are domestic sav-
ings and the inflow of capital from abroad. Capital inflow is discussed in sec-
tion i, below; domestic savings, in section ii. In the discussion of the probable
effect of the exchange system on productivity, the focus will be on the impact
of the severe quantitative restrictions of Phase I. The role of the exchange
rate in the growth process will then be analyzed and, finally, the degree of
openness in the development of the economy, that is, the growth of exports
versus import substitution.
i. THE SIZE OF CAPITAL: FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The greater part of capital inflow into Israel has been derived from sources
which may be said to depend very little, if at all, on normal profit motiva-
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tions. This is true even of a source such as Government of Israel De-
velopment (formerly Independence) bonds sold abroad and, of course, other
major sources such as contributions to the United Jewish Appeal, loans and
grants from the U.S. government, and payments by the German government
for reparations or personal restitutions. All these may be motivated, some
strongly, by factors such as the rate of immigration to the country or the
country's security situation, but not by expectations of private profit. To
some extent, the size of capital inflow from these sources is conceivably also
dependent on the domestic economic situation in Israel—the worse it is, the
larger the inflow. In that sense, it may be said that the exchange system,
through its effect on general economic conditions, might have an impact on
capital inflow from these sources. But this is very indirect, and the degree of
causal connection of this nature must in any event be very small. The investi-
gation here is confined, therefore, to that part of capital inflow which may be
assumed to respond to profit motivations, namely, to private foreign invest-
ment.
Exchange control and quantitative restrictions maybe expected to affect
private foreign investment mainly in two ways working in opposite directions.
First, foreign capital may be attracted to specific industries if they are granted
protection and their profitability is consequently raised. If import-replacing
industries that are encouraged by grants of QRs attract foreign investment
more than do export industries or industries that produce solely for the do-
mestic market, the result would be a net increase in foreign investment. A
case might be made for the claim that this was the situation in Israel, at least
in the earlier years of its existence.
On the other hand, exchange control is likely to lead to a large measure
of bureaucratic intervention in capital inflows from abroad and in investment
decisions; it may also result in a high degree of uncertainty about the course
of future events concerning such issues as capital repatriation or the stability
of the degree of protection granted to each industry. These factors would tend
to hinder capital inflow into the country. During the first half of the 1950s,
this was indeed one of the main arguments voiced in Israel against the eco-
nomic policy of that time.
Table 6-1 contains data on private foreign investment in Israel. It must
be pointed out that the quality of these data is probably the poorest of all
among the balance-of-payments estimates, although their accuracy has im-
proved over the years. Estimates of reinvestment of profits are the worst com-
ponent of the data on capital inflow from this source and are often no more
than rough guesses; estimates for the period prior to 1955 are available, but
are not presented here because they are believed to be completely unreliable
and misleading, grossly overestimating the correct levels. There is almost no152THEEXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
TABLE 6-1
Private Foreign Investment, 1955—72
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Col. 1—Balance-of-payments data for 1955—60
from Bank of Israel, Annual Report, various years; for
1961—67, ibid., 1970, Table 111/26; for 1968—72, from
ibid., 1972, Table 14/26.
Col. 2—Data in column I converted to Israeli
pounds at current formal rate and divided by value of
net investment in current prices. Formal rate from
Table 5-1; net investment from Bank of Israel, Annual
Report, various years.
doubt that, in these years, recorded private "foreign" capital was to a large
extent domestically owned repatriated capital disguised as foreign capital be-
cause the latter was accorded special privileges.1
The argument that QRs attract foreign capital to the protected industries
could not be tested directly, for lack of data about the allocation of foreign
investment by industries. From Table 6-1 it may be seen, however, that in the
mid-1950s (and presumably in earlier years as well), the total size of foreignTHE SIZE OF CAPITAL: DOMESTIC SAVINGS 153
privateinvestment was very small—about $10 million—$20 million annually
or roughly 5 per cent of total investment in the economy. It may be con-
cluded that even if the grant of OR protection attracted foreign investment,
the amount could not have been large enough to have had a significant im-
pact on growth.
Foreign investment started rising, and assumed substantial proportions,
only in the late 1950s. As may be seen from Table 6-1, in both absolute size
and as a ratio to total investment, it was many times larger in the 1960s than
in the 1 950s. This could conceivably be explained by the process of liberaliza-
tion, in line with the argument mentioned above: the effect of the largely lib-
eralized exchange system of the 1960s was to reduce the obstacles to private
capital inflow presented by the exchange-control system of the earlier period.
Unfortunately, however, various other explanations could be given for the
phenomenon, and it is hard to devise a method of refuting any of them, or to
assign to each of them a measure of importance.
First, in Israel, the size of private foreign investment is without any
doubt correlated with the country's security position. In the early and mid-
1950s Israel's position on this score was considered to be problematical; only
beginning in late 1957 or early 1958 did expectations of roughly a decade of
relative peace start to prevail.2 Another set of factors which might have at-
tracted foreign investment was the greater heterogeneity of the economy as
time progressed, the higher income level, larger and more varied supply of
skills, etc., all of which may be assumed to facilitate foreign investment. It
should also be noted that worldwide total private foreign investment has been
rising rapidly.
To sum up, it may be deduced from available data that (a) during the era
of stringent exchange controls and QRs, private foreign investment was neg-
ligible; and (b) in later years, private capital inflow increased very substan-
tially, an event which may be explained by several economic factors and cir-
cumstances, one of which is the policy of liberalization.
ii. THE SIZE OF CAPITAL: DOMESTIC SAVINGS
Savings of Households.
Personal savings may be affected by the exchange system primarily in
two ways. One is through the possible impact of the system on interest rates,
which in turn may affect household savings. However, for the reasons noted
below, it may be assumed that the size and structure of interest rates in Israel
were very little influenced directly by the exchange system, although the rates
were undoubtedly affected to a large extent by the economy's relationship with154THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
the outside world. The other channel of influence of the exchange system on
personal savings patterns could conceivably be through the mechanism of
repressed inflation. If QRs, low prices, and rationing of imports are part of a
general program of price control and rationing, they may conceivably lead to
some forced saving. In Israel, this could apply to the early half of the 1950s,
and particularly to the years 1950—5 1.
Data on savings in Israel are rather poor. As a rule, savings are derived
as a residual (that is, as the surplus of domestic investment over the import
surplus) and incorporate all the net errors of the national accounting esti-
mates.3 Moreover, it follows that the separate components of savings are not
estimated; household savings are, therefore, not known. Some estimates of
magnitudes could have been constructed on the basis of consumer surveys, but
even these are not available for the earlier part of the period. In Table 6-2,
therefore, only savings as a whole (estimated as a residual) are presented.
TABLE 6-2






1950 1.5 1958 —0.9
1951 8.2 1959 2.1
1952 —1.2 1960 1.7
1953 —5.3 1961 2.5
1954 —3.9 1962 —0.8
1955 —2.2 1963 —0.4
1956 —8.1 1964 —0.2
1957 —2.4 1965 —1.4
SouRcE: Nadav Halevi and Ruth Klinov-Malul, The Economic
Developmentof Israel(New York: Praeger, 1968), Table 32. For further
explanation, see aècompanymg text and note 3.
It appears that the economy's savings rate was indeed unusually high in
1950 and particularly in 1951. In view of the crude nature of the data, not
much could be inferred from it; but it does appear likely that controls and
rationing, which reached their peak in 1951, did indeed contribute to the
"forced" creation of considerable personal savings.
Savings of Firms.
Hypotheses about the way in which savings of firms might be affected by
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through interest rates. Furthermore, empirical verification is, in the case of
Israel, not really feasible, since there are practically no comprehensive, ag-
gregate data on business saving. From various surveys and case studies, the
general impression gained is that business saving in Israel is probably nil, or
at least extremely low in comparison with normal patterns elsewhere.4 This
pattern could not be attributed directly to the exchange system. It is most
probably due to the structure of the long-term capital market in Israel, in
which capital imports have played a dominant role, particularly in earlier
years. Capital imports received by the government (or the Jewish Agency,
which for the present purpose is rather similar to the government) at first con-
stituted the major source of revenue in the government's development budget,
which in turn was the major source of financing of domestic investments.
Firms availing themselves of this financing enjoyed two advantages: first, they
received it at a very low interest rate compared to what it would have been in
a free market. And, second, they were not required to maintain a minimum
level of net worth relative to the size of investment, as a firm seeking free-
market financing would have had to do. The two normal motivations of busi-
ness saving—namely, the high level of interest on borrowed capital, and
the dependence of such borrowing on capital accumulation in the firm itself—
were thus absent in the greater part of the Israeli economy. This financing
mechanism has been in use since the establishment of the state of Israel, ex-
cept that in recent years it has been less dependent on capital imports: a
larger part of the government's resources for financing has been raised in the
local market from pension funds, other institutions, and through some volun-
tary purchases of government bonds by the public. However, the manner in
which funds have been lent to firms has remained basically unchanged, leav-
ing them with little motivation to save and increase their net worth.
Government Savings.
Decisions about savings are part of the general scheme of government
policies, and it would not be feasible to construct an even approximately reli-
able model of government behavior and the role of the exchange system in
this scheme. In the case of Israel, however, one specific factor may be pointed
out and even quantified, albeit in a most tentative way. As already noted sev-
eral times in this study, the government of Israel is a major recipient of capital
imports, mainly in the forms of sales abroad of Independence and Develop-
ment bonds, the reparations payments from Germany (during 1953—63), and
grants and loans from foreign governments (mainly the United States). To
this should be added the income of the Jewish Agency from the United Jewish
Appeal, which for the present purpose is almost equivalent to a government
income. A nile of behavior to which the government has normally adhered is
that government receipts from abroad are allocated to the development156THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
budget.5 Since capital imports are recorded in the government's accounts at
the formal rate of exchange, maintaining a rate below the equilibrium level
leads to a reduction in the size of these receipts as expressed in local currency.
This would be so even if the effective rate for foreign trade purposes were
not below its equilibrium level: maintaining a rate higher than the formal rate
by means of duties on imports and subsidies to exports implies, in effect, a
net result in which part of the potential revenue in the development budget
(from capital imports) is diverted, as revenue from tariff duties, to the cur-
rent budget.6
In Table 6-3, column 1 contains one possible, and arbitrary, estimate of
this revenue toss. The estimate is initially based on the assumption that the
average effective exchange rate (EER) for value added in exports is the
equilibrium exchange rate. This assumption facilitates the computations in-
volved, but there is almost no doubt that it underestimates the level of the
equilibrium rate and thus also the results in columnThe figures shown in
this column are derived by multiplying the excess of the EER for exports over
the formal rate by the amount (in foreign exchange) of the capital inflow
recorded as revenue in the development budget. The results are then put in
perspective by comparing them with GNP (column 2) and net domestic in-
vestment (column 3). Although the size varies markedly in different years
(naturally, it is smallest immediately after a formal devaluation and then rises
gradually), it is as a rule rather significant. This impression is strengthened if
the downward bias just pointed out is borne in mind and if it is noted that the
estimate in column 1 is based only on the budget of the government proper,
and not on the accounts of the Jewish Agency, in which a similar element is
contained.8
It thus seems that maintenance of a below-equilibrium formal exchange
rate was of some consequence in reducing governmental saving. It must again
be emphasized that a calculation such as that presented in Table 6-3—based
as it is on arbitrary assumptions—could not yield more than a general im-
pression. Moreover, even such a tentative conclusion must be hedged by re-
calling that it is based on a mechanistic assumption regarding the government's
method of operation, namely, that changes in the government's receipts from
abroad are fully reflected in the development budget without any offsetting,
discretionary changes by the government. To what extent such a mechanistic
view of the government's decision-making process in this matter is correct
would not be easy to determine.9
Importation of Investment Goods.
It will be recalled that, throughout the period of study and with only
few exceptions, investment goods have been consistently imported at theTHE SIZE OF CAPITAL: DOMESTiC SAVINGS 157
TABLE 6-3




Column 1 as Per Cent of
Net
Budget Domestic
(mill. IL) GNP Investment
Years (1) (2) (3)
1951 5 0.8 3.3
1952 7 0.7 2.6
1953 36 2.6 12.2
1954 70 3.9 19.0
1955 3 0.1 0.5
1956 32 1.3 6.2
1957 59 . 2.0 8.9
1958 85 2.5 11.8
1959 104 2.6 13.1
1960 111 2.5 13.0
1961 156 2.9 13.8
1962 0 0 0
1963 8 0.1 0.5
1964 13 0.1 0.6
1965 18 0.2 0.9
1966 51 0.4 3.4
1967 87 0.7 10.3
1968 133 1.0 7.2
SOURCE:
Col. 1—Derived from the government's budgetary accounts, by the method explained in
the accompanying text.
Cols. 2 and 3—Underlying data on GNP and domestic investment are in current market
prices. GNP is from Table A-2; net investment, from Bank of Israel, Annual Report, various
years.
a. Budgetary data, on which column 1 is based, are originally for fiscal years (April—
March) and are applied here arbitrarily to calendar years.
lowest exchange rates, and most investment goods were usually free of tariff
duties. Likewise, the process of liberalization from QRs was much faster and
more comprehensive for machinery and equipment than for most other goods.
The main argument submitted in Israel for this policy has been that it encour-
ages investment and thus increases the stock of capital and accelerates the
process of economic growth.158THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
There is no doubt that cheap imports of investment goods raise the yield
of investment projects, and thus increase the demand for investment. For this
actually to lead to an increase of investment and however, it must also
induce an increase either of domestic saving or of capital inflow from abroad.
One possibility of such an effect occurring is that the increased demand
will lead to a higher income and, with a positive (marginal) propensity to
save, to higher savings. This would be the case, of course, where, without
the added demand, the economy is below the full-employment equilibrium
level. In Israel, however, full employment, usually with some inflation, has
been the normal situation. And it is hard to believe, although the point can-
not be easily verified, that without the extra push given to investment by the
exchange system, aggregate demand would be low enough to lead to unem-
ployment. Given relatively full employment, it may thus be assumed that the
policy under consideration could lead to increased savings only at the expense
of consumption.
It might be argued that the increased yield of investment projects leads
to higher interest rates in the market, and that this may, in turn, lead to a re-
duction of consumption by households. The last link in such a reasoning is
conceptually doubtful; but even if it were not, this argument would not be
relevant for the case of Israel. Interest rates in Israel almost throughout its
history have been little affected by market forces; and there has been almost
no connection between long-term rates on business borrowing and most of
the rates significant to households—either as borrowers or as lenders. It
might be more plausible to expect business firms to increase their savings in
response to the higher profitability of investment projects. It will be recalled,
however, that this component of saving in Israel is believed to have been nil
most of the time, although data to substantiate this impression are scarce. This
by itself is not a proof that the effect of the profitability factor on business
saving was also nil, since conceivably these savings might otherwise have
even been negative. And without any feasible way of testing this hypothesis,
I must rest the argument at that.
The low rate of exchange for imports of investment goods does clearly
increase only one element of saving, namely, saving by the government. It
works to offset part of the loss, just discussed, to the development budget be-
cause the importation of investment goods at low prices tends to increase
the real value of allocations (grants or loans) from the development budget.
Put differently: had tariff duties been imposed on imports of investment
goods, part of the expenditure on these goods would have been used not to
buy real assets but to pay the duties; and this part would have augmented the
government's current budget, that is, public consumption rather than invest-
ment. Thus, this absence of duties has to be offset against the aforementioned
loss in the development budget; that is, from estimates such as those in col-PRODUCTIVITY OF THE ECONOMY: EFFECT OF QRs 159
umn 1 of Table 6-3, there must be subtracted the (assumed) difference be-
tween the equilibrium and formal rates of exchange multiplied by the (for-
eign-exchange) value of imports of investment goods.
Finally, it is necessary to ask whether the increased profitability of in-
vestment projects may not lead to the encouragement of private foreign in-
vestment, and thus increase the productive capacity of the economy. In prin-
ciple, foreign capital inflow should respond favorably to increased profitabil-
ity. But it should be pointed out that another important attribute of the ex-
change system was that private foreign investors were usually granted only
the formal rate of exchange.'° Had a higher (say, the equilibrium) exchange
rate been fixed for both capital transfers and imports of investment goods (for
the projects contemplated by foreign investors), the net result should have
been an increase, rather than a decline, in the profitability of projects under-
taken by foreign investors.'1
iii. PRODUCTIVITY OF THE ECONOMY: EFFECT
OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
There are several reasons for expecting the productivity of an economy to be
low in a period of controls in general and of quantitative restrictions of im-
ports in particular. The reasons are too well known to be discussed here at
any length and will be surveyed only briefly.
First, of course, is the allocative inefficiency involved in a process in
which prices and profits are largely disregarded as indicators for the use of
resources and the channeling of investment, and are replaced by administra-
tive decisions. This inefficiency may be assumed to be particularly great in a
situation such as that of Israel in the early 1950s, where large-scale controls
were imposed within a short period, without being preceded by a long learn-
ing period during which the administrative machinery might have gradually
developed decision-making processes and rules to help reduce the misalloca-
tion involved in the arbitrary nature of the system.
The allocative inefficiency alluded to here is primarily a longer-term
phenomenon that is concerned with the patterns of investment in the economy.
We may, however, note also other factors, resulting from the frictions of a
bureaucratic mechanism, which contribute more to shorter-term losses of
productivity (although they, too, may eventually have long-term conse-
quences).
One important source of such inefficiency is an inappropriate level of
inventories. Since inventories of raw materials and other purchased inputs are
not determined under a QR system solely by firms themselves, the latter often
find themselves too short on inventories. In a developed (currently), or semi-160THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
developed, economy such as Israel's, production in many industries is de-
pendent on the availability of a large variety of purchased items, the exhaus-
tion of any one of which may easily frustrate or even halt altogether the pro-
cess of production. On the other hand, and for precisely the same reason, firms
may be expected in such situations to try to maintain unusually large inven-
tories. Since they cannot be certain, under a OR system, about the availability
of current supplies of imported inputs, they tend to hold a higher stock of ma-
terials than they would under a price-regulated economy; and presumably
some firms, not necessarily always the same ones, succeed in securing the
higher level of inventories they desire. Thus, there are two opposite ways by
which QRs can lead to losses of production due to the holding of nonoptimal
levels of inventories: irregularities in production created by insufficient in-
ventories; and waste of capital (as well as the cost of physical maintenance
and protection of the materials) involved in keeping excessively high in-
ventories.
Quite similar phenomena may be expected to be found in the case of
fixed capital assets. On the one hand, plants stand idle, their construction
uncompleted, because some of the necessary pieces of machinery and equip-
ment or construction materials could not be secured, at least not on time. On
the other hand, knowing the difficulties which must be met in trying to buy
the required machinery, firms try to anticipate their needs far into the future,
and to order machinery when the need for it is neither immediate nor quite
certain. They may also buy machinery and equipment which are at least
partly inadequate, either because they are so directed by the controlling au-
thority or because these are available at a certain moment, and the firm does
not see a reasonable chance of securing better equipment in the future. Thus,
for two opposite reasons—inaccessibility of some capital assets and anticipa-
tory stockpiling of others—part of the capital may lie idle.
For all these' reasons, it may be expected that inefficiency and waste
would be widespread when QRs are extensive; and that a shift to price deter-
mination of imports would lead, at the time of the shift, to a particularly
large increase in productivity because this waste would be reduced. This effect
on the rate of increase of productivity should diminish as the shift to price
regulation is completed.
Empirical verification of this hypothesis is not easy. Accounts of these
forms of waste in individual firms, or even whole industries, were frequent in
Israeli newspaper reporting of the economic scene during the early 1950s.
The feeding of chickens with bread (which was always kept cheap and in
abundant supply) or the presence of rusted machinery lying in the backyards
of plants became almost popular symbols of that period.12 These, however,
suggest the flavor of the time but give little indication of the extent of waste
and inefficiency.PRODUCTIVITY OF THE ECONOMY: EFFECT OF QRs 161
TABLE 6-4
Productivity of Resources, 1951—65














1951 7.9 5.5 4.2 —11.5 22.8
1952 —2.3 —3.4 —20.6 11.8 —1.0
1953 —3.4 —3.6 —1.4 — —8.5
1954 12.2 15.8 0.8 15.6 28.9
1955 6.8 10.0 6.6 —7.4 —1.0
1956 2.4 3.6 2.2 15.7 7.6
1957 1.8 2.8 —1.1 2.7 6.6
1958 2.0 3.4 6.7 12.3 2.0
1959 6.2 8.0 7.0 12.0 9.4
1960 2.8 3.6 3.8 1.0 7.0
1961 2.8 4.0 4.8 3.1 0.6
1962 3.5 4.8 —0.8 4.7 6.6
1963 3.4 4.5 5.9 11.0 2.9
1964 3.7 4.6 6.6 7.4 2.7
1965 0.6 1.2 6.2 —4.1 1.0
Annual averages
1951—52 2.8 1.1 —8.2 0.2 10.9
1953—55 5.2 7.4 2.0 2.7 6.5
1956—65 2.9 4.1 4.1 6.6 4.6
1951—65 3.4 4.3 2.1 5.0 5.8
SOURCE: Calculated from A. L. Gaathon, Economic Productivity in israel (New York:
l'raeger, 1971), Table A-12.
Table 6-4 is an attempt not to derive any precise estimate of produc-
tivity, but to test the hypothesis described above. The measure presented in
the table was constructed by A. L. Gaathon, along Kendrick lines, to estimate
productivity of total resources of the economy.13 The period from 1951 to
1965 (the earliest and latest years for which data about change in produc-
tivity are available) is divided into three subperiods: 1951—52—the peak time
of the QR system; 1953—55—the main years of transition to price regulation;
and 1 956—65——the years following.
Among the series in Table 6-4, the most pertinent to the purpose at162THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
hand are those given in columns 2 and 3. These data, relating to a selected
part of the economy, are more appropriate than those in column 1, which
cover the economy as a whole, since the former exclude residential housing
(which cannot be neatly included in a meaningful estimate of productivity)
and the public sector, in which productivity estimates are largely arbitrary.
Among the major sectors of the economy, the factors affecting productivity
and efficient allocation of resources are more likely to have an important im-
pact in manufacturing (column 3) than in agriculture (column 4) or trans-
portation (column 5). Agriculture during the earlier years was heavily af-
fected by weather conditions; up to 1958, years of good and poor harvest
alternated; and as it happens, the three-year period 1953—55 contains two
years of poor harvest, greatly reducing the estimated average rise of produc-
tivity in these years. In transportation, on the other hand, estimates for the
earlier years may be technically correct, but devoid of much meaning. For
instance, the very impressive increase (23 per cent!) in productivity in this
sector from 1950 to 1951 is obtained without taking into account the long
lines and waste of time of consumers, with which much of this rise of pro-
ductivity was involved.14
From most of the data in Table 6-4, particularly in columns 2 and 3,
the impression gained is indeed in conformity with the postulated effect of
QRs; namely, the rate of increase of productivity rose markedly from 1951—
52, the peak period of QRs, to 1953—55, the period of rapid transition to the
price mechanism as a means of regulating imports as well as other activities
in the economy. For the economy as a whole (excluding housing and the
public sector), the rate of increase of productivity was not as fast in the
decade from 1956 to 1965 as in the transitional years, 1953—55—though
this is not true for the manufacturing sector; and it was faster than in the
period of controls, 195 1—52. It should be recalled, moreover, as was em-
phasized in Chapter 2, that in the transitional period, 1953—55, the level of
imports evidenced only a slight rise; in fact, there was a rather substantial
decline in the ratio of imports to output. The rapid increase in productivity in
those years thus cannot be explained by the removal of bottlenecks through
an increased supply of imports.
It thus seems that these data conform to a-priori expectations about
changes in productivity as the nature of the exchange system changed. It is
tempting to go further and state that the causal connection between the two
is thus verified or substantiated. This, however, would be a rather dubious in-
ference, since the Israeli economy during its earlier years underwent fast and
radical changes in size and structure. It should be recalled that the huge wave
of immigration had subsided by late 1951; It is possible that increases in pro-
ductivity in the first few years following this date occurred because immi-
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in jobs they were not suited to during the period of mass immigration, and
later sought and found more appropriate occupations. In this, the newcomers
were aided by their acquisition of the basic elements of the language and by
their growing acquaintance with the organizational principles of the country,
its institutions, etc., which at first they did not grasp at all. For the same rea-
sons, those who did not relocate but stayed in the same plant or occupation
were likely to increase their efficiency very rapidly in the first few years after
migration. Factors other than adjustment of the labor force were also likely
to work in the same direction. Thus, it is most probable that those who entered
Israel during the period of the large wave of immigration found an economy
with a very inadequate infrastructure, but this was rapidly corrected in the
first few years after the wave subsided, thus removing important bottlenecks
and facilitating the efficient use of resources. It may also be argued that the
reason the economy could produce more in the period 1953—55 with fewer
imports, may have been that the pattern of investment in earlier years was ad-
justed to the scarcity of imports.
For all these reasons, productivity should have been expected to rise
rapidly in the years 1953—55 even without a change in the QR regime. There-
fore, it cannot be claimed that the whole of the rapid rise which actually took
place in those years should be attributed to the change in the exchange sys-
tem. Unfortunately, there is no feasible way of distinguishing the various fac-
tors which contributed to the increased productivity of that time. Thus, it may
only be stated that the hypothesis that a shift from QRs to price regulation of
the economy leads to faster growth through increased productivity is at least
not contradicted by the facts of the Israeli experience. More generally, it may
perhaps be stated that the rapid growth of productivity during the transitional
period was due to a "learning-by-doing" process; and that as part of this
process the shift from QRs to price regulation represents a "collective" learn-
ing, reflected in the changing policy patterns.
iv. THE EXCHANGE RATE IN THE GROWTH PROCESS
The effects of growth on the exchange rate may be expected to be particularly
strong in an economy with Israel's specific attributes—limited size, meager
resources and, above all, the role played in it by capital imports and by the
import surplus. We shall be concerned here not with the structure of the ex-
change-rate system, that is, with its discriminatory nature with respect to dif-
ferent industries and products, but rather with the over-all (i.e., average)
level of the exchange rates for exports and imports.
There is some ground for expecting that economic expansion relative
to the world as a whole leads to, and is conditioned upon, an increase in the164THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
price of foreign exchange relative to domestic prices. If growth is "neutral"
(neither export nor import biased), the terms of trade of a relatively expand-
ing economy are expected to deteriorate. If, as is often assumed, with con-
siderable justification, foreign demand for a country's exports is less elastic
than foreign supply of its imports, the terms-of-trade effect of a devaluation
would be expected to be negative (that is, the price of exports would fall
relative to the price of imports), and the "required" worsening of the terms of
trade could be achieved through a devaluation.
In Israel's case, probably due to the small size of its economy, no deteri-
oration of the terms of trade took place, despite the rapid economic expansion
(as mentioned in Chapter 1) which certainly surpassed that of the world as a
whole and that of Israel's major trading partners. This result is apparent from
the aggregate data on export and import prices presented in Table 6-5. These,
it should be noted, are far from being perfect estimates; they are particularly
deficient for the early and mid-1950s. Furthermore, they refer only to trade
in goods and hence exclude services. Yet the general impression gained is
probably reliable. It appears that the terms of trade of the country have been
fairly stable, with fluctuations concentrated mainly in the early 1950s—the
time of the Korean crisis and the years immediately following. There seems
to be hardly any discernible trend, certainly not from 1954 on: the terms-of-
trade index in the late 1 960s and early 1 970s is about at the level of the mid-
1950s. Even the prices of exports in which Israel plays an important role in
the world market—mainly citrus fruits and polished diamonds—appear not
to have fallen in relation to the country's import prices (though this detail is
not shown in Table 6-5),probablybecause the income elasticities of demand
for these exports are rather high.
If both export and import prices rise to the same extent, the terms of
trade are not affected, but the real value of any given size of a unilateral capi-
tal inflow is thereby reduced. Consequently, the country suffers a real loss
and a deterioration of the over-all terms of its international transactions.'5
Since import prices have actually increased over the period surveyed, this
deterioration has indeed occurred. But, it should be noted, this deterioration
is not in any way causally related to the process of growth. Also, the loss of
the purchasing power of capital imports due to the increase in prices, al-
though of some substance, is not very significant in relation to the main role
played by capital imports for the problem at hand. This role deserves a few
additional words of explanation.
Israel started out with an inflow of capital that was very high in propor-
tion to the size of its economy. Suppose that the economy's growth, from that
point on, is "neutral" in both production and consumption; that, with un-
changed prices, the proportions of saving and of domestic investment do not
change (i.e., are independent of the scale of the economy); and that the ex-THE EXCHANGE RATE IN THE GROWTH PROCESS 165
TABLE 6-5
Israel'sTerms of Trade, 1959-71




Export Import col. 1 to
Prices Prices cot. 2)
Year (1) (2) (3)
1950 100 100 100%
1951 107 120 89
1952 105 121 86
1953 99 108 92
1954 106 101 104
1955 111 109 102
1956 117 115 101
1957 121 124 98
1958 119 110 108
1959 107 107 101
1960 104 107 97
1961 105 103 102
1962 104 101 103
1963 109 102 106
1964 109 105 104
1965 113 107 106
1966 120 109 111
1967 118 109 108
1968 117 107 110
1969 123 112 110
1970 121 113 107
1971 125 115 108
NOTE: Discrepancies between figures in column 3 and ratios calculated directly from
columns 1 and 2 are due to rounding.
SOURCE: 1950—55—Michael M ichaely, Foreign Trade and Capital Imports in Israel (Tel
Aviv: Am Oved, 1963; in Hebrew), Table 38.
1956—7 1—Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years.
ternalposition of thecountry is initially in equilibrium. The economy will
thenremain in external equilibrium, with given relative prices, only if autono-
mous capital inflow grows at the same rate as the rate of expansion of the
economy. If capital imports fail to rise to this extent, the economy's growth166THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
pattern must move toward either an increase of exports (beyond the rate of
growth of the economy) or import substitution, or a combination of both, so
that the excess of the economy's demand for imports over its supply of exports
will fail to expand at the same rate as the economy's growth. A policy which
leads to a growth process biased in this way must be based on an increase in
the relative price of foreign exchange. This may, of course, be done in a vari-
ety of ways: through a formal change of the rate, through manipulation of
nonformal components, through measures such as QRs, governmental sub-
sidies to investment in tradable industries, etc.
As is shown in Table 6-6, autonomous capital imports have indeed failed
to expand in Israel as much as the economy's real product.'6 With some sub-
stantial year-to-year fluctuations, this trend of relative decline seems to be
quite obvious.'7 For the external position of the country to remain in equi-
TABLE 6-6
National Product and Autonomous Capital Inflow, 1950—66
Autonomous Col. 2as
GNP Capital Inflow Per Cent
(1950100) (1950 =100) of Col.1
Year (1) (2) (3)
1950 100 100 100
1951 130 139 107
1952 138 156 113
1953 136 139 102
1954 163 206 126
1955 185 168 91
1956 202 175 87
1957 220 161 73
1958 235 195 83
1959 265 199 75
1960 283 239 84
1961 312 282 90
1962 343 316 92
1963 382 299 78
1964 419 334 80
1965 457 296 65
1966 462 257 56
SOURCE: App. A, Tables A-2 and A-14.
Columns 1 and 2 are in constant prices; column 2 is derived by deflating current-
dollar flows by the indexofimport prices in Table 6-5, column 2.THE EXCHANGE RATE IN THE GROWTH PROCESS 167
librium—or, alternatively, to stay at the same level of disequilibrium through-
out the period—the relative price of the foreign exchange should have been
rising throughout the period.
As may be seen from Table 6-7, which includes some data from the last
chapter, the relative level of effective exchange rates did indeed go up very
considerably over the period covered: by 1971 the level for both exports and
imports was roughly two and one-half times that of 1950. It should be noted,
however, that this trend of increasing PPP-adjusted EERs was not uniform
throughout the period; on the contrary, two fairly distinct subperiods may be
TABLE 6-7







of Cols. 1 and 2
Year (1) (2) (3)
1950 100 100 100
1951 103 95 96
1952 136 130 131
1953 159 139 142
1954 202 201 201
1955 212 247 241
1956 227 240 237
1957 243 246 245
1958 235 223 226
1959 231 223 225
1960 235 224 227
1961 220 206 210
1962 226 258 249
1963 215 245 235
1964 208 234 227
1965 196 224 215
1966 198 215 209
1967 210 215 213
1968 230 234 233
1969 235 242 240
1970 240 234 236
1971 244 244 244
SOURCE:Export and import rates are from Table 5-6. Weights for last column are annual
data for value added of exports and imports for domestic use.168THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
distinguished. The rates went up until the mid-1950s—1955 in the case of
imports and 1957 in the case of exports—and from then on remained at a
rather constant level, despite some fluctuations, which sometimes persisted for
periods of several years each. By and large, this division into subperiods is
consistent with the movement of the data in Table 6-6 on autonomous capital
inflow.18 It may be seen there that the decline in the ratio of capital inflow
to GNP went on from the beginning of the period until From then on
until 1964, the ratio shows a few large fluctuations, but no downward trend;
and only in 1965 and 1966 does the downward movement reappear.
A change in the price of foreign exchange will, of course, achieve the
purpose of adjusting the economy to changes in the relative size of autono-
mous capital inflows only if it has a corresponding effect on the relative size of
the import surplus. As will be recalled from the preceding chapter, and as can
be seen in column 1, Table 6-8, below, this indeed has been the case: the rela-
tive size of the import surplus declined substantially during the 1950s and,
with sometimes considerable year-to-year fluctuations, remained at a constant
level in later years. On the basis of analysis in the preceding chapter, there is
reason to believe that these trends were primarily due to changes in the rela-
tive level of the rate of foreign exchange.
v. EXPORT GROWTH AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
At least as interesting as the performance of the import surplus is the develop-
ment of its separate components—imports and exports. Specifically, it is use-
ful to determine how much of the reduction of the import surplus was
achieved by reducing imports and how much by increasing exports. For a
country in Israel's position, that is, starting out its economic expansion with
a very large import surplus, such an investigation would provide a means of
determining whether the process of growth was biased toward or against for-
eign trade. A related question, of course, is whether any bias that is found
could be attributed to the operation of the foreign-exchange system.
Table 6-8 contains estimates of value added in exports (column 3)
and imports for domestic use (column 5),obtainedby assuming that the
amount of each will be in the same ratio to GNP in the current year as it actu-
ally was in the preceding year. The figures in columns 2 and 4 are the actually
observed values of these aggregates. The excess of actual exports over their
"expected" value is a contribution to the reduction of the ratio of the import
surplus to GNP; and the opposite is, of course, true of imports. These contri-
butions are presented in columns 6 and 7 in absolute amounts and in columns
8 and 9 as ratios to GNP.2°
It appears from these figures that the period can be divided into twoEXPORT GROWTH AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 169
subperiods: the 1950s up to and including 1959, and the 1960s and early
1970s up to and including 1971. In the 1950s, most of the contribution to
the relative reduction of the import surplus came from the import side; the
contribution due to the rise of exports was also positive, but much less signifi-
cant in size. The dominance of imports in their impact on the development of
the import surplus was, however, simply due to their overwhelming size in
comparison with exports. In relation to their own size, as is shown by the data
in columns 10 and 11, the contributions of exports and imports to the decline
of the import surplus were quite similar—even slightly higher in exports than
in imports. In this period, then, both exports and imports were involved in the
process of reducing the import surplus.
During the 1960s, the relative increase in exports continued as before.
The contribution of exports to the relative reduction of the import surplus
was, on average, in the same ratio to the national product as it was in the
1950s. However, since the relative size of exports was gradually increasing,
this meant a lower ratio of exports themselves, as may be seen in column 10.
Imports, on the other hand, exhibited a relative rise, that is, they contributed
to an increase of the import surplus rather than to its reduction. This trend
was not as substantial as the opposite trend of the 1 950s, but its existence
cannot be doubted: from 1959 to 1971, imports rose over the increase which
would have maintained the ratio of imports to GNP constant from year to
year by about 6 per cent of GNP; or, put in a different way, the relative an-
nual increase of imports over this period (average of the 1960—7 1 figures in
column 11) was about 2 per cent of imports.
Looking back at columns 1 and 2 of Table 6-7, it seems that the differ-
ence in import trends between the 1950s and the 1960s could be explained by
the difference in movement of the EERs. The remarkably large increase in
the import rate until 1955 was sufficient to overcome the effect of relaxing the
ORs and still have a substantial negative impact on the size of imports. It
could be assumed, moreover, that the effect of such a substantial price rise
on imports is not quickly consummated, but is spread gradually over several
years. Thus, the relative decline of imports during the 1950s could well have
been due to the increase in import exchange rates in the first half of the decade.
In the 1960s, on the other hand, import rates remained fairly constant, with
a few substantial year-to-year fluctuations. If relative prices of imports were
the only determinant of imports, the size of imports (in relation to GNP)
should have been about constant over this period. The slight increase in the
ratio of imports to GNP over this period could conceivably be explained by
the liberalization of the 1960s; but it could also be due to changes in taste
or to above-unity income elasticity of demand for imports. As yet, not
enough research on this issue is available to substantiate any conclusion.2'
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trend that would be expected in view of the movement of PLD-EERs for ex-
ports: an increase of exports accompanying a sharp rise of export rates. As
with imports, the continued rise of exports in the late 1950s could possibly
be explained by the rise of export rates a few years earlier: the latter rose
sharply until 1954, and then mildly until 1957. The persistent rise of exports
during the 1960s, however, can by no means be explained by price changes:
just as with imports, the level of export rates was not rising during this period.
It might be argued that the continued rise of exports in the 1960s was still a
lagged effect of the rate increases of the 1950s. But this is most doubtful, on
two grounds. First, it is unlikely that events of this kind would still be influen-
tial three to as long as fifteen (!) years later. And second, if the effect of the
rate had persisted over this long period, it should have been reflected in im-
ports as well as in exports, since there is no apparent reason for it to do
otherwise.
One possible explanation of the development of exports during the 1960s
may be the use of various measures of export encouragement which are not
taken account of in the estimate of PLD-EERs for exports, either because
they could not be quantified or because they are not constituents of the rate
(since they do not depend on the size of exports). Some of these are devices
used to encourage exports of goods produced in existing facilities. But mainly,
these are measures which affect the allocation of new investment in favor of
industries with high export potential.
The share of industries of varying export intensities in total manufac-
turing investment is shown in Table It appears that the share of rela-
tively export-intensive industries rose during the period from 1958 to 1969.
An appropriate point of separation between "low-export" and "high-export"
industries seems to be an export proportion of 10 per cent. Thus, the first ten
industries listed are classified as low export, and the remaining eight, as high
export.23 In this classification, the share of the high-export industries in in-
vestment seems to have risen substantially during the years presented. But the
trend of development is not uniform over the period and the selection of an-
other dividing line for classification might have shown a weaker trend.24 Such
a trend may, of course, be due to measures or factors other than the govern-
ment's investment policies, but it is difficult to find alternative explanations.
In summary, it appears that a distinction should be made between levels
of protection of exports and import substitutes and movements of these
levels. There seems to be no doubt that, even in the late 1960s and early
1970s, the level of protection afforded by the exchange system was consider-
ably higher for import substitutes than for exports (see Chapter 4, section 3).
In this sense, the government's policy, as expressed in the exchange system,
has been biased toward import substitution. When policy changes over the
years are considered, on the other hand, it appears that exports and importEXPORT GROWTH AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 17.3
TABLE 6-9










Industry Sales, 1965 59 61 63 65 67 69
1. Electrical and electronic
equipment 1.8 2.61.6 2.2.2.76.04.9
2. Transport equipment 1.9 5.77.5 5.16.68.98.7
3. Metal products 2.6 4.84.1 3.95.24.77.8
4. Nonmetallic mineral products4.1 4.17.67.58.5 7.9 2.9
5. Printing and publishing 4.3 2.8 1.82.02.6 1.32.3
6. Leather and leather products4.9 0.50.30.30.60.70.5
7. Paper, cardboard, and their
products 5.5 10.72.71.61.83.92.6
8. Basic metals 5.7 11.57.92.62.6 1.32.4
9. Food products 7.4 16.513.614.416.518.513.8
10. Wood and wood products 8.2 2.64.1 3.43.32.52.8
Total, lines 1—10 61.851.243.050.455.748.7
11. Chemicals 12.2 10.87.3 7.19.67.76.2
12. Machinery 12.7 2.12.22.12.7 3.86.3
13. Textiles 14.5 13.019.716.111.111.817.6
14. Rubber and plastic products15.2 4.6 3.82.93.94.2 5.8
15. Clothing 16.4 0.90.70.90.71.01.7
16. Miscellaneous manufacturing33.7 0.80.8 1.10.70.8 1.2
17. Mining and quarrying 49.1 5.814.026.420.714.512.2
18. Polished diamonds 99.0 0.20.30.40.20.50.3
Total, lines 11—18 38.248.857.049.644.351.3
Total, all industries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SouRcE: Yoseph Tawil, "Effective Exchange Rates and Investment in Manufacturing
Exports"(M.A. diss., Hebrew University, 1973; in Hebrew), calculated from data in App. lB.
substitutes were similarly encouraged during the 1950s. In the 1960s, the di-
rection of policy change must have been biased toward exports: the growth
process was biased toward trade.25 This is probably explained, at least in
part, by rionprice elements in the trade and exchange system. The slight rela-
tive increase in imports during these years, with rather stable EERs (as they
are actually estimated), may possibly be due to the gradual relaxation of
quantitative restrictions on imports, which during the 1950s had provided an174THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
added motivation for import substitution, particularly of finished consumer
goods. Similarly, measures taken by the government in its budgetary and
long-term credit policies to direct investments toward export industries may
provide an explanation of the growth of exports, during the 1960s, in addi-
tion to the encouragement resulting from relative changes in the exchange
rate.
NOTES
1. See the discussion of "imports without payment" in Chapter 2.
2. This conclusion is supported by data on proceeds from tourist expenditures in
Israel, the tourist inflow being also dependent to a large extent, it may be assumed, on
the country's security position. These proceeds, as recorded in the balance-of-payments
estimates, amounted to about $5 million to $6 million annually until 1957. In 1958, they
increased to $12 million; in 1959, $16 million; 1960, $27 million; 1961, $30 million;
1962, $38 million; 1963—66, $50 million—$55 million. The Six-Day War of 1967 mate-
rially changed the nature of tourism in Israel, leading to a jump in proceeds from this
item in subsequent years.
3. An excess of the import surplus over domestic (net) investment is thus recorded
as negative savings in the economy: this has been the case in most of the years recorded
in Table 6-2 as well as in later years.
4. This is not true of households, for which consumer surveys find the patterns in
the ratio of savings to disposable income to be rather similar to those observed in other
middle- and high-income economies. It should be noted, however, that disposable income
includes personal transfer payments from abroad, such as German restitution payments,
which are not included as income in the national accounts. Consequently, personal con-
sumption spending out of these transfer payments is recorded as dissaving. This treat-
ment results in ratios of savings to GNP which are very low or even negative(cf.
Table 6-2).
S. An important exception of the most recent years is U.S. military assistance, given
in the form of long-term loans for the purchase of military equipment in the United
States. Technically, these receipts too are recorded in the development budget, but there
is no doubt that causally they are related to the size of military expenditures, which are
part of the current budget.
6. The late Amotz Morag was first to point out this effect on the allocation of gov-
ernmental income between the two parts of the budget. This is discussed rather exten-
sively in his Public Finance in Israel: Problemsand Development (Jerusalem:Magness
Press, 1966; in Hebrew), Chap. 4.
7. It will be recalled that on an earlier occasion the highest among the major export
rates was used in this study to represent the equilibrium level, an assumption which,
although also arbitrary, could be better defended.
8. The downward bias is partly offset by an element of government saving that is
pointed out at the end of this section.
9. Once more, an obvious case in which this procedure was notfollowedis that
pointed out in note 5,above:U.S. military assistance of recent years is definitely not re-
garded as a contribution to the development budget, although the revenue is recorded
there; technically, thisis reflected in transfers from the development to the current
budget.NOTES 175
10.The most important exception was probably the transfer of capital through the
imports-without-payment market, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Another, less sig-
nificant, arrangement for transferring capital at above the formal exchange rate, which
was carried out mainly in the 1950s, was through the purchase of "blocked accounts"
in Israel, which were then released for investment. It was also possible to transfer capi-
tal by buying Development bonds below par in the New York market and selling them
to the Israeli Treasury at their face value at the formal rate, but little use was made of
this technique.
11. This analysis should not be taken as exhaustive of the government's policy in
the area of foreign investment. Over most of the period, the government applied specific
measures to encourage foreign investment that were independent of the foreign-exchange
system. Most important was the "law of encouragement of (foreign) investment," under
which an "approved" investment enjoyed certain rights, primarily accelerated depreci-
ation and reduced corporate income tax, as well as a governmental commitment to per-
mit the unhindered repatriation of invested capital and the transfer of profits.
12. A few illustrative case studies of the waste can be found in Alex Rubner, The
Economy of Israel (London: Frank Cass, 1960), particularly the appendixes.
13. See A. L. Gaathon, Economic Productivity in israel (New York: Praeger,
1971). The productivity measure is constructed to compare changes in real output with
changes in real inputs, the latter being weighted by their shares in national
income.
14. This is a well-known deficiency of estimates of productivity of the services sector
in Soviet-type economies: disregard of the consumer's time leads to the relatively high
measures of productivity normally found in these sectors in Soviet-type countries com-
pared with free-market economies.
15. This would not be true to the extent that the nominal value of unilateral trans-
fers may be assumed to rise with price rises; an obvious example is gifts in kind.
16. Table 6-6 contains data only through 1966, since the Six-Day War of 1967 has
led to a radical transformation in this respect. Autonomous capital inflow has grown very
substantially since 1967; but at the same time, an equally large increase of defense
expenditures, to a large extent in foreign exchange, may be said to have led to a sub-
stantial structural change of the economy. An analysis starting with the assumption of
"neutral" growth is, therefore, obviously inapplicable to these years.
17. It should be remarked that in 1950 and 1951, autonomous capital imports were
actually higher than the figures on which the data in column 1 of Table 6-6 are based. As
was mentioned earlier, in those two years, freed sterling reserves of roughly $100 mil-
lion were used. Since formally this is a use of short-term assets, they were not counted
as autonomous capital imports, although for present purposes they should be so re-
garded. If those balances are taken into consideration, the relative decline of capital im-
ports (column 3) over the period is even greater than indicated in the table. Using the
same base as in the table, i.e., with the sterling-financed inflow excluded, the average rela-
tive inflow for 1950 and 1951 including the sterling inflow would be 128; the corre-
sponding average for the figures in column 3 is 104.
18. Some portion of the relative rise of the foreign-exchange Tate in the first sub-
period (1950—57) may be explained as a correction of an existing overvaluation of the
currency at the start of the period. But in 1950, the degree of disequilibrium of the rate
could not yet have been high enough to account for any major share of the increase in
the relative rate of almost 150 per cent between 1950 and 1957.
19. It should again be recalled that the indices for 1950 and 1951 were in fact higher
because of the availability in those years of freed sterling balances (the indexes for 1950176THEEXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY
and 1951 would be, respectively, 131 and 126). It should also be remarked that the
increase of the ratio in 1954 is misleading: as was mentioned earlier, a large volume
of short- and medium-term loans was raised in the United States in that year to build
some foreign-exchange reserves and repay hard-pressing short-term loans. But since this
"consolidation loan" was not raised directly by the Israeli government but by the Jewish
communities in the United States, itis recorded as a unilateral transfer of capital to
Israel. If these items are taken into account, the downward trend of the ratio from
1950 to 1957 is sharper than it appears to be.
20. In principle, the summation of the export and import figures of columns 8 and
9 for each year should yield the same result as the year-to-year changes which may be
derived from column 1. The slight differences between the two are due to rounding.
21. In a study in progress conducted by Yehezkel Guttman, at the International
Trade Workshop of the Hebrew University, a slight decline in the ratio of imports to
income as income rises was observed in cross-sectional data.
22. These intensities are measured by the proportion of exports in the industry's
product in a given year, 1965; but use of the 1968 proportions yields basically similar
results.
23. Although use of the 1968 export intensities would somewhat change the ranking
of industries, use of the 10 per cent dividing linewould leave precisely the same industries
in each class as the 1965 intensities.
24. The problem of arbitrariness of the classifications can be overcome by using
Lorenz curves to compare the entire distribution year by year. Using this procedure,
Tawil found evidence of the trend—Yoseph Tawil, "Effective Exchange Rates and In-
vestment in Manufacturing Exports" (M.A. diss., Hebrew University, 1973; in Hebrew).
25. A bias toward trade development is indicated also in Halevi, "Devaluation," and
Weinbiat, "Effect of the Effective Exchange Rate."